Independent regulatory agencies are created in order to enhance the stability and credibility of economic regulation, and to improve policy implementation. So far, most research in political science has 
Introduction
Governments worldwide are increasingly relying on "independent" agencies for performing a variety of regulatory functions (Jordana et al., 2011; Vining et al., 2014) . The first input in this direction has come from a rich academic literature (see Section II) which has theorized that, in some policy domains, only bureaucrats who are not accountable to politicians can properly defend the collective interest. In addition to (and because of) that, the creation of independent agencies has been identified as a "best practice" and accordingly promoted among supranational organizations and relevant epistemic communities (see for instance OECD, 2002 OECD, , 2012 . However, this diffusion has occurred without an accurate assessment of the costs and benefits of "agencification". Independence is meant to improve the countries' credibility and to ensure the consistency of policy enforcement through time (see Majone, 1994 Majone, , 2001 ; Levi-Faur, 2005; Jordana et al., 2011; Gilardi, 2008 ). Yet, no systematic investigation of the impact of independence on the regulatory outcome has been so far carried out (see Vining et al., 2014) . Are more independent agencies better enforcers than executives or less independent agencies? Since independence implies less control of bureaucrats, and ultimately less accountability to voters (see McCubbins and Schwartz, 1984, p. 169; Gilardi, 2002, pp. 873-74) , greater independence should "pay off", yielding better regulation. Otherwise, why would delegation to independent agencies be worth recommending?
This article seeks to carry out such a test in a field that has been subject to agencification earlier and more extensively than any other in Europe: competition policy. To do so, it analyses the impact of the independence of national competition agencies (NCAs) on two proxies employed to measure their performance: foreign direct investment and consumer prices. The results show that the formal independence of a competition agency does not have any significant impact on either indicator, thus calling into question the assumption that independence yields better regulatory performance
The remainder of this article proceeds as follows. Section I sums up the evolution and the current set up of EU competition policy. Section II reviews the academic literature analysing delegation to independent regulatory agencies, and its implications for the current analysis.
Section III discusses how the performance of competition enforcers can be assessed. Section IV illustrates the theoretical framework from which the hypotheses to be tested are derived.
In Section V, the article presents the original data on formal independence of NCAs and the other indicators employed in the empirical analysis, which is illustrated in Section VI. The last section discusses the results and concludes.
I. Background: EU competition policy enforcement
Among the public policies of the European Union (EU), competition (or antitrust) policywhich is aimed at preventing abuses of market power or forms of collusion between undertakings -is the one in which the European Commission (and its powerful Directorate-General for Competition, DG COMP) enjoys the greatest autonomy from both EU legislators (European Parliament and Council) and member states' governments (McGowan and Cini, 1999: p. 177; Cini and McGowan, 2008; Wilks, 2005) . The literature has identified several objectives of competition policy in the EU: economic welfare, integration of the internal market, the protection of consumers, the freedom to compete (Lianos, 2013 ; see also Cini and McGowan, 2008) . Since the introduction of a European competition regime (in the Treaty of Paris, 1951 , and the Treaty of Rome, 1957, and then with Council Regulation 19/62), the Commission managed to secure its control over every stage of the policy implementation and enforcement. The result has been a "common competition policy, and not just a coordinated one" (Cini and McGowan, 2008, p. 18) . The scope of EU competition policy, as well as the powers of the Commission, have been constantly growing since the 1960s (Wilks, 2010; Kassim and Wright, 2009 ). In the field of competition policy, the Commission (and the national competition agencies, NCAs) can start investigations and impose sanctions, while other EU institutions and the governments of the member states have no (formal) means to intervene.
Given the importance of competition policy for European integration, it does not surprise that the Commission was given, since the very beginning, large autonomy in every stage of its enforcement -being "prosecutor, judge and jury" (McGowan and Cini, 1999, p. 190 ).
However, this full delegation of enforcement powers had the effect of increasingly overburdening the Commission (Wilks, 2005, p. 435; Kassim and Wright, 2009, p. 752) . During the 1990s, two solutions to this problem were advanced. The first was the creation of an independent European Cartel Office that would have enforced competition law in the same way the European Central Bank was meant to enforce the monetary policy of the Eurozone (Wilks and McGowan, 1995) . This proposal aimed to solve not only the overload problem, but also the Commission's "overtly political approach to decision taking" (McGowan and Cini, 1999: 188; Wilks and McGowan, 1995) that many experts criticized.
1 This project, however, was backed only by Germany and never met enough support to be seriously consid-
ered. An alternative solution aimed at reducing the Commission's workload was put forward by the United Kingdom first (Wilks and McGowan, 1995, p. 263 ) and then fully endorsed by the Commission with its 1999 "White Paper on the modernization of EU competition policy" (European Commission, 1999) . This proposal suggested to decentralize antitrust enforcement, by empowering both the Commission and the NCAs to enforce EU competition policy. The argument of the Commission was that, since all the member states had developed a "culture of competition", their agencies "were now mature enough to take up the torch of implementation" (Wilks, 2005, p. 436) . If the lack of national competition traditions had made it impossible to delegate enforcement to national authorities in 1962, the Europeaniza-1 This problem relates to the collegial and political nature of the Commission. Cases are prepared by the DG COMP, but then discussed and voted by all the members of the Commission (see Karagiannis, 2010, and van Waarden and Drahos, 2002, p. 917) .
tion of the national competition regimes (Cini and McGowan, 2008, p. 37; van Waarden and Drahos, 2002, p. 923 ) was now permitting a more decentralized set up. Given the apparent lack of any hierarchy or formal power in the new decentralized system, competition policy scholars have shown disagreement as to its true nature. Wilks (2005) finds that the Commission has not really decentralized competition enforcement, but rather "'Europeanized' the national competition regimes" (Wilks, 2005, p. 437) : the ECN would therefore be "the equivalent of a transnational agency that has gone beyond the powers of the member states to control" (Wilks, 2005: 437) . On the contrary, Kassim and Wright (2009) argue that the 2003 reform was the response to increasing pressures from the epistemic community of competition policy experts, that is a response to the overload problem and to the need for a more flexible case management system.
The decentralization, however, raises the question of how a policy can be uniformly enforced by very different institutional actors. Indeed, NCAs in EU member states enjoy very different degrees of formal independence from the respective national political authorities.
How does this influence their performance? Is this independence ultimately needed? The empirical puzzle that EU competition policy poses is, put simply, whether the independence 2 Until then, NCAs had the power to sanction cartels but not to grant exemptions ex Art. 101(3).
3 Other similar networks have been created also in the fields of finance, energy and telecommunication (see Maggetti, 2014 This study seeks to adjudicate this dispute.
II. Causes and consequences of independence
Competition agencies have spread all over Europe (and in the rest of the world) between the mid 1980s and the early 2000s (Wilks and Bartle, 2002, p. 149) , following a trend of "agencification" that has characterized both advanced and developing economies (Jordana et al., 2011; Coen and Thatcher, 2005; Gilardi, 2005 Gilardi, , 2008 Levi-Faur, 2005) . Empirical evidence indicates that regulatory agencies have "become the 'appropriate' model of governance in capitalist economies" (Jordana et al., 2011 (Jordana et al., , p. 1344 and that their establishment has followed a pattern of "diffusion" across countries and sectors (Jordana et al., 2011 (Jordana et al., , p. 1356 .
The literature on regulatory agencies has identified several factors explaining the delegation of policy enforcement to non-majoritarian institutions.
It has been argued that politicians resort to creating independent agencies when they need to reassure economic actors that they will implement consistently through time a certain pol-icy choice (Majone, 1996 (Majone, , 1999 (Majone, , 2001 ; empirical tests can be found in Gilardi, 2002 Gilardi, , 2008 Elgie and McMenamin, 2005; Wonka and Rittberger, 2010; Guidi, 2014) . The act of delegation to an agency, which is given the power to take decisions that once were left to the government, serves as a signal of credible commitment. The government imposes a high cost on a future decision of reneging on its promise, thus making it more unlikely. Like delegation of monetary policy to central banks is aimed at making a certain inflation target credible (see among others Kydland and Prescott, 1977; Barro and Gordon, 1983; Rogoff, 1985) , delegation to IRAs is aimed at making other targets -for instance, the state's commitment to fair competition -credible. Other contributions (Moe, 1990 ; for empirical tests see Gilardi, 2008; Wonka and Rittberger, 2010; Guidi, 2014) do not assume politicians to be interested in granting credibility through time, but simply in protecting their policy choices from future majorities that could overturn them. However, these authors too maintain that the effect of IRAs is that of insulating policy implementation from the influence of alternating governments. Scholars have also emphasized the need for expertise that arises "in informationally intense issue areas" (Franchino, 2004, p. 274) , in which politicians do not possess enough knowledge and ability to formulate sound and effective policies (Bawn, 1995; Majone, 1996; Epstein and O'Halloran, 1999; Franchino, 2004) . Another often cited reason for delegating to IRAs is that those who are in charge of taking unpopular decisions find it convenient to delegate these tasks to bodies that are perceived as separated from them. IRAs would let politicians avoid the blame for choices that create winners and losers, whose blame would be thus addressed to bureaucrats (Fiorina, 1982; Thatcher, 2002; Wilks and Bartle, 2002) .
The literature has also identified other determinants of agency independence that do not strictly relate to the policy-makers' goals, but rather to the political and economic environment in which agencies are established. In particular, several empirical studies have found that veto players (the number of actors whose agreement is necessary for a change of the status quo in a political system) may have a twofold effect: one the one hand, they can be perceived as "stabilizers" of the policy output, and therefore make delegation to an independent agency less necessary (Gilardi, 2008) ; on the other, a high number of veto players can be a precondition for credible delegation, as it signals that it will be difficult to return to the previous institutional arrangement (Moser, 1999; Keefer and Stasavage, 2003) . Finally, some recent contributions have highlighted that also the "variety of capitalism" is a determinant of agency independence. In particular, liberal market economies tend to rely on IRAs more than coordinated market economies (Guardiancich and Guidi, 2015) . As for national competition agencies, Guidi (2014) finds that countries with intermediate degrees of coordination, being less capable of efficiently allocating capital and labour force, tend to have more independent competition authorities than those of liberal and coordinated market economies, in order to compensate for their perceived economic inefficiency.
Besides the explanation of why agencies are more or less independent, less attention has been paid to the consequences of agency independence -with the exception of central bank independence, whose impact on inflation has been thoroughly studied (Grilli et al., 1991; Cukierman et al., 1992; Giavazzi and Pagano, 1988; Alesina and Summers, 1993; Franzese, 1999) . The literature on the consequences of agency independence on policy output, in fact, is still in its infancy and mainly based on case studies (Verhoest, 2005; Verhoest et al., 2010; Busuioc et al., 2012 ; a more rigorous and comparative study is that of Maggetti, 2009 ). Although some studies on agencification in public service provision have proved that managerial autonomy increases performance in the short term (see Vining et al., 2014, pp. 11-12) , and although the impact of enforcement on business practices has been shown in various fields (see e.g. Jappelli et al., 2005; Fairman and Yapp, 2005; Gathmann, 2008) , for many types of regulatory agencies, included NCAs, no empirical work of this kind has been done.
NCAs in the EU are an interesting case to study in this respect, for three main reasons.
First, empirical studies on antitrust enforcement have so far been rare (but see McChesney and Shughart, 1995) . Second, since NCAs in the EU have been empowered to enforce not only national, but also EU competition law, and given the centrality of competition policy for the functioning of the Single Market and of the Economic and Monetary Union, it is crucial to ascertain whether NCAs' independence has an impact on competition enforcement.
Third, NCAs in the EU represent a rather unique sample of differently independent regulators that enforce very similar policies. Significant differences in their regulatory outcome are most unlikely to be due to differences in the legislation, and should instead point to different regulatory capabilities and practices.
III. How to measure performance
What is (or what should be) the link between formal independence and performance? More specifically, how can a competition agency be proven successful? A first choice that must be made is that between measuring NCAs' policy output and their policy outcome. By policy output I mean the practical actions and activities carried out by the authorities, i.e. (i) investigations started to collect information on possible competition law violations; (ii) decisions on these violations, which may include sanctions and/or commitments that firms are required to accept; (iii) decisions on mergers. By policy outcome I mean the effect that the NCAs' activity has on the economy, the market and the behaviour (and perceptions) of market actors.
Both approaches have advantages and drawbacks.
The main advantage of measuring the policy output is that information on investigations and decisions is quite easy to collect -almost all authorities provide it on their annual reports.
However, the simplicity of this measurement comes with several shortcomings. The first is that not all NCAs record this information uniformly. For instance, some count as "investigations" even brief procedures that are opened after receiving complaints and closed almost immediately after, while others do not. Also, while all authorities report infringement decisions (that is, decisions closed with some sort of sanction), there is less uniformity as regards decisions closed with "commitments", when the NCA closes the procedure without issuing any sanction, but at the same time the firm commits to change one or more practices that were likely to be sanctioned by the agency. Even more problematic are the effects of NCAs' "leniency programmes", which grant exemptions from fines (or fine reductions) to whistle blowers. These procedures, to be effective, must be carried out with some confidentiality, which further complicates the measurement of NCAs' activity. Another problem related to measuring policy output is that, even if one managed to collect information on all acts for all agencies, it would not be possible to weigh the impact of each decision. One important decision issued against a multinational firm certainly has a higher impact on the economy than 20 decisions against small competition infringements. Still, unless one assesses the impact of all decisions one by one (a virtually impossible task), all decisions should be assigned the same weigh. Finally, a quantitative measurement of investigations and decisions would not allow to assess the impact of the creation of a NCA, because only the activities of already established agencies could be compared. This would severely reduce the number of available cases to be analysed.
Measuring the policy outcome does not have such limitations. More cases and years can be used in the empirical analysis, and, what is more, the effect of the establishment of a NCA can be assessed, because it is possible to code the absence of a NCA as "zero independence".
Moreover, this approach fits better the purpose of this article, which is to test the "credibility effect" yielded by independent regulatory agencies. Credibility is an "immaterial" good, which is supposed to have an impact independently from the practical activity of a body.
That said, measuring the policy outcome of NCAs is problematic because it is not simple to identify the variable(s) on which independence should have an impact: "competition" is an ubiquitous concept. The next section seeks to address this issue.
IV. Theory and hypotheses
Before putting forward hypotheses to be tested, let us consider the assumptions that inform the theoretical model presented in this article. First of all, this study assumes that politicians have mixed incentives as regards competition policy. They are in favour of competition because they think it can boost growth, but at the same time they know that not everyone wins from competition: national firms that are not competitive and their employees can be damaged by a strict competition enforcement, and politicians may be tempted to avoid such consequences. The second assumption is that firms and private economic actors invest in a country if they are reasonably convinced that the political authorities of that country will not favour national firms. Thirdly, international investors know that, even if politicians commit to avoid any interference in the economy, various electoral incentives can lead them to renege on their promises.
More specifically, a potential foreign investor invests in a country if she or he is confident that its investment at t 0 will not be disfavoured at t 1 . Although Art. 107 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union prohibits state aid, a national government could favour a "relaxed" enforcement of competition policy that aims at not punishing abuses of dominant position or unlawful agreements between national firms. Let us consider that, although the Commission can in theory enforce EU competition policy in all countries (thus making the national government's attitude irrelevant), in practice it is not able to do so (see Section I).
Therefore, the competition enforcement carried out by national authorities has an impact on the decisions of international investors. The only way in which a government can make international investors trust its country is by delegating competition enforcement to a body, the NCA, that it cannot control. The more the NCA is independent from the government, the less likely it is that it will be influenced by its preferences when enforcing competition policy.
Let us bear in mind that an independent NCA has no connection with the electoral cycle, and therefore no incentive to follow the government's preferences for a less strict competition enforcement: an independent NCA maximizes its reputation, not the political principal's utility (Majone, 1996, p. 6 ).
Thus, the first hypothesis to be tested is the following:
H1: The more a country's NCA is independent, the more that country will be attractive for international investors
As regards another clear goal of competition policy, consumer protection (see Section I), a similar logic should apply. If competition is not distorted, prices for a given quantity of goods or services are determined by the intersection between the demand and supply curves.
Vice versa, monopolies, abuses of dominant positions and cartels all aim at extracting rents, fixing prices higher than the equilibrium value. Not all firms have an incentive to do so, of
course. Yet, for undertakings that may find it convenient to extract monopolistic rents or to collude with competitors, the likelihood of a strict competition enforcement should matter (for an example of the influence of policy enforcement on economic actions see for instance Jappelli et al., 2005) . Similarly to the case of foreign investments, politicians might not be incline to fight these practices if they do not have an electoral incentive to do so. But in the same fashion as above, tying their own hands can be a credible signal that they will not exert any influence in competition enforcement. Therefore:
H2: The more a country's NCA is independent, the lower will be its general price level
V. Data and operationalization
As regards the dependent variables, the two hypotheses presented in the previous section posit that independence should have a positive impact on foreign investments and a negative impact on consumer prices. Hence, I choose to test the impact of independence on two indicators:
(i) the amount of foreign direct investment as a percentage of GDP, which is a proxy for a country's ability to attract investors vis-à-vis other countries; 5 (ii) the consumer price index, a proxy for the NCAs' effectiveness in granting low prices.
6
The main explanatory variable is the formal independence of NCAs in all EU member Some words need to be said about the choice of focusing on formal rather than on actual independence. Although scholars have attempted to measure actual (or de facto) independence in addition to -or in contrast with -formal independence (see Maggetti, 2007 Maggetti, , 2012 Hanretty and Koop, 2013) , there are two reasons for which this study focuses only on the latter. First, this article aims at testing the impact of legislative measure on policy output:
legislation is the main "variable" that politicians use, and it is important to ascertain whether it has an impact per se. Second, this analysis wants to apply to NCAs the same logic applied to central banks when testing if their statutory independence has an impact on the inflation rate: using the same explanatory variable (formal, or statutory, independence) can help to meaningfully compare the impact of such type of delegation in two distinct, albeit related, policy fields.
In a statistical analysis of this kind one must also control for other factors that are likely to influence the response variables. In particular, this study employs a set of economic controls and a set of institutional and political controls. to measure government preferences, government stability and efficiency of decision-making, all factors that may affect the propensity to invest in a country and the competitiveness of its economy.
Tab. 1: Random effects panel regression models
Dependent variables: 
VI. Statistical analysis
The two hypotheses presented in Section III are tested with a random effects regression model (see Table 1 ), 27 formulated as:
where y it is the value of either response variable (ratio of foreign direct investment to GDP or consumer price index) of country i in year t, x it is the set of regressors for each coutry and year with their coefficients β, α is a constant term, u i is a country specific random element and 19 Whether or not the government has "an absolute majority in the houses that have lawmaking powers", variable "allhouse" in the DPI. 20 The number of seats for the government majority (variable "numgov" in the DPI) divided by the total number of seats (variable "totalseats" in the DPI).
21 A dummy variable (variable "plurality" in the DPI), coded as 1 if "legislators are elected using a 'winnertakes-all' / 'first past the post' rule", 0 otherwise.
22 A dummy variable (variable "pr" in the DPI), coded as 1 "candidates are elected based on the percent of votes received by their party", 0 otherwise.
23 Variable "tensys" in the DPI, measuring how many years "the country been autocratic or democratic". In the sample used in this analysis, all countries are democracies.
24 Variable "checks" (Keefer and Stasavage, 2003) in the DPI. 27 The regression models in Table 1 have been performed with the package plm (Croissant and Millo, 2008) in R (R Core Team, 2013) .
ε it is the error term (see Greene, 2012, p. 347 For each dependent variable, the regression has first been run including the economic controls only (Models 1 and 4), then including the institutional controls only (Models 2 and 5), and finally including all controls (Models 3 and 6). With all the different specifications, the results of the two models are consistent. Finally, both models display some degree of heteroscedasticity. For this reason, robust standard errors have been computed and are displayed in Table 1 . Robust standard errors for both models do not significantly differ from the "classical" ones, thus indicating that we do not face any mis-specification problem (see King and Roberts, 2014) .
28 A Hausman test (Hausman, 1978) has been performed for all the models, comparing the random effects with the fixed effects model. In all cases, the null hypothesis is confirmed, meaning that the coefficients of the two models do not differ systematically -and, therefore, that the random effects model is preferable (see Greene, 2012, p. 379) .
Discussion of results and conclusions
Both H1 and H2 do not appear to be confirmed by the empirical analysis: the independence of NCAs does not have a significant impact on either foreign direct investment or consumer price index. Regarding the first hypothesis, there is no clear evidence that countries without a competition agency (that is, with NCA independence = 0) receive, on average, less foreign direct investment than countries with a competition agency scoring higher in the independence index. This also means that countries increasing the independence of their competition agency over time do not experience, all else equal, a significant increase in foreign direct investment. In general, no variable is significant in Models 1, 2 and 3: not only the formal independence of NCAs, but also the economic and institutional control variables fail to account for variations in foreign direct investment.
In Models 4, 5 and 6 as well, the variation in the consumer price index is not explained by NCAs' independence. In these models, however, several control variables appear to have a significant impact on prices. Consumer prices are positively affected, among others, by GDP growth, and negatively by government expenditure and increases in labour productivity. It is interesting to note that the overall explanatory power of Models 4, 5 and 6 is much higher than that of the first three models. The economic and institutional controls are more effective in predicting the variation in the consumer price index than they are in predicting the variation of foreign direct investment. In other words, the consumer price index appears to be more correlated than the percentage of foreign direct investment to GDP with the other economic, institutional and political indicators.
Despite a considerable body of (academic and policy-oriented) literature suggesting that independence should improve regulatory outcomes, this study points to a lack of evidence for such effect, at least as far the indicators here considered are concerned. The hypotheses formulated in this study assumed that independence yielded a "credibility effect" that would be recognized by market actors, when deciding where to invest and whether or not to collude. we generally label as de facto independence (see Section V above): the "self-determination of agencies' preferences, and their autonomy throughout the use of regulatory competencies" (Maggetti, 2007, p. 272 ) might be more important than statutory rules giving on paper more or less leeway to competition agencies.
Also the lack of confirmation for H2 invites some reflection. The "credibility effect" does 3) What are the formal obligations of the agency vis-à-vis the government? The agency must present reports more than once a year for approval The agency must present only one annual report that must be approved The agency must present an annual report for information only The agency has no formal reporting obligations 4) What are the formal obligations of the agency vis-à-vis the parliament? The agency must present only one annual report that must be approved The agency must present an annual report for information only The agency has no formal reporting obligations 5) Who, other than a court, can overturn an agency's decision? The government, in specific circumstances
